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The hunting of the Snark : organizing and synchronizing of informational elements for homeland defense and civil support

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THESIS

THE HUNTING OF THE SNARK: ORGANIZING AND SYNCHRONIZING OF INFORMATIONAL ELEMENTS FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL SUPPORT

by

John M. Wilson

June 2009

Thesis Advisor:	Gail F. Thomas
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THE HUNTING OF THE SNARK:
ORGANIZING AND SYNCHRONIZING OF INFORMATIONAL ELEMENTS FOR
HOMELAND DEFENSE AND CIVIL SUPPORT

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ABSTRACT

The tension between Public Affairs (PA) and Information Operations (IO) illustrates the struggle to organize and synchronize informational elements in support of homeland defense and civil support. Public Affairs focuses on credibility by providing factual information in a responsive manner to present a positive image of the organization. Information Operations focuses on proactive operations that use influence to shape the information environment. Public Affairs and IO's purpose is to communicate the command mission and operations. The current informational landscape does not support a cohesive informational strategy. Current doctrine creates a tension between these two elements that centers on credibility. This tension prevents cohesive informational efforts. The principles of war and the nature of the information environment compel a need for an organizing construct and synchronizing force for effectiveness. This study examines policy and doctrine to understand the nature of the information environment, PA, IO and Strategic Communication (SC). The study examines an optimal organizational strategy using the Star Model that provides the organizing construct and the required synchronizing force. The outcome of this research is a set of policy and doctrine recommendations that will support optimal organization and synchronization of information elements to communicate effectively for the homeland.

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ACRONYMS

CNA	Computer Network Attack
CHINFO	Chief of Naval Information
CND	Computer Network Defense
CNO	Computer Network Operations
COMCAM	Combat Camera
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DoD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DSB	Defense Science Board
DSCA	Defense Support of Civil Authorities
EM	Electromagnetic
EW	Electronic Warfare
GAO	Government Accountability Office
HD	Homeland Defense
HS	Homeland Security
IO	Information Operations
JFWC	Joint Forces Warfighting Center
JIOWC	Joint Information Operations Warfare Command
JPJ	Joint Publication
JS	Joint Staff
MILDEC	Military Deception
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defense Command
OPSEC	Operations Security
PA	Public Affairs
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
SC	Strategic Communication

USG	United States Government
USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The journey is more important than the destination.

As an Information Operations Planner, a complete understanding of information is an illusion. Rather, learning how to exist and work with information is the daily task. Today, as an Information Operations Planner, I tackle the subject of information and how to use it every day. I struggle to find the best way to use information, and I work with other information professionals to gain an advantage. That often finds me having a difference of opinion with my fellow Public Affairs workers.

Five years ago, I watched my grandfather pass on. It was only in sorting through his possessions that I realized he had been in Public Affairs and media relations. I worked day-to-day trying to figure out how to interact with Public Affairs types. I realized I had missed the opportunity to ask a trusted person about Public Affairs. As I wrote this thesis, I found some of my grandfather's writings on media relations. They confirmed my conclusion about the nature of Public Affairs. I have dedicated this thesis to my grandfather, hoping that in the journey I have learned the things I wish I had asked him then.

I would be remiss if I did not thank my wife and children for their patience while I was consumed in this work. I would also like to thank all those who patiently put up with my harebrained ideas, whiteboard sessions and paper reviews. I would also like to thank my advisor, Gail Thomas, for her insight and guidance on this work. I would like to thank Robert Josefek for being willing to be my second reader. I would like to thank Colonel Rich Leap for his patience and time in reviewing this work. I would like to thank Richard Affeld, who has mentored me during my years as an IO planner. I would like to thank Curtis Jenkins, who has provided a sounding board for all of my ideas about Public Affairs, Information Operations and Strategic Communication over the years. I would like to thank Simon Carr, who gave me a broader view of information and

I.   THE HUNTING OF THE SNARK

For the Snark's a peculiar creature, that won't
Be caught in a commonplace way.
Do all that you know, and try all that you don't
Not a chance must be wasted to-day![1]

Many people view military operations as focused on putting bombs on target. However, even getting bombs on target requires the multiple elements of logistics and network connectivity. Homeland defense and support of civil operations do not often involve direct or kinetic action, such as putting bombs on target. For these operations, multiple informational elements, such as Public Affairs (PA) and Information Operations (IO), play a vital and growing role. These elements develop the narrative for an operation. The narrative tells the story of the operational events, and supports its execution. This narrative carries as much weight as any other operational activity. Without it, operations can be stifled or ineffective.

Operations are guided by the principles of war.[2] These principles are time tested and operationally understood in a military context. Operations also take place within a defined space. For informational elements, this space is called the information environment. Creating a cohesive narrative with multiple informational elements has become increasingly complex because these elements are not synchronized and organized to create a cohesive narrative. Together, the principles of war and the information environment require an organizing construct and synchronizing force for effective informational activities.

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[1] Lewis Carroll, *The Hunting of the Snark* (New York, NY: Penguin Putnam, 1974), 68.

[2] Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3–0 Joint Operations* (Incorporating Change 1) (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2008), II–21.

A. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN INFORMATIONAL ELEMENTS

The tension between PA and IO illustrates the larger struggle to organize and synchronize informational elements to support homeland defense. These informational elements support the operational objectives of deterring attacks, defending the homeland, supporting civil authorities, and reassuring audiences. According to Joint Publication 3–61,

> PA and IO activities directly support military objectives, counter adversary disinformation and deter adversary actions. Although both PA and IO require planning, message development and media analysis, the efforts differ with respect to audience, scope and intent, and must remain separate.[3]

Based on the guidance of Joint Publication 3–61, these two means of using information in homeland defense and civil support would seem distinct and mutually supporting.

Public Affairs focuses on credibility by providing factual information in a responsive manner. Its purpose is to create and maintain a positive image of the organization or command. It emphasizes communicating via the media to domestic audiences.[4] This passive or responsive nature is reflected in the mention of passive PA guidance or the use of "respond to query."[5] Public Affairs packages the factual information to present a positive organizational image. It is strictly limited to informing its audience.[6] It never attempts to influence an audience.

Information Operations integrates capabilities, especially informational capabilities, to gain an operational advantage. The landscape of IO is divided between its doctrine and its practice. Its doctrine focuses on how to use

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[3] Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs* (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2005), xii.

[4] Ibid., II–1.

[5] James Lacey, "Who's Responsible for Losing the Media War in Iraq?" *Proceedings* 130, no. 10 (October 2004): 39–40.

[6] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs* (2005), III–18.

information against adversaries to enable mission accomplishment. It can do this by enhancing or protecting operations, shaping foreign perceptions of operations, or by deterring, influencing, disrupting, or corrupting adversary activities.[7] Doctrine defines IO as being comprised of five core and a number of related and supporting capabilities. Electronic Warfare (EW) and Computer Network Operations (CNO) are a technical means of conducting IO.[8] Operations Security (OPSEC), Military Deception (MILDEC), and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are a cognitive means of conducting IO.[9] Information Operations can be passive and responsive (OPSEC or Computer Network Defense (CND)) but also proactive in nature (PSYOP, EW, MILDEC and Computer Network Attack (CNA)).[10] The doctrine of IO affects the selection of information and what it tells the adversary. The practice of IO integrates any set of capabilities to gain an operational advantage. It seeks to affect the will, understanding, or capability of an intended audience. While doctrine focuses on information and adversaries, practice focuses on the audience and the tools to accomplish the objective. This distinction drives to different ends and limits the implementation of IO.

While each element's focus is distinct, PA and IO's aim is to communicate in support of the command mission and operations. It is their doctrine that creates a tension between these two elements; that tension is centered on the idea of credibility.

The above considerations challenge whether PA and IO can be organized and synchronized to support homeland defense and civil support operations. If

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[7] Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations* (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2006), I–1, I–6.

[8] Computer Network Operations consolidates both Computer Network Attack (CNA) and Computer Network Defense (CND).

[9] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations* (2006), II–1–II–5.

[10] Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations* (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 1998), viii.

this cannot happen, PA and IO will likely overlap and contradict each other in the execution. This will impede the freedom of operational action and detract from mission accomplishment.

Organizing and synchronizing informational elements is filled with tension, which is metaphorically illustrated in the Victorian children's story, *The Hunting of the Snark*. This tale, written in 1876 by Lewis Carroll, describes the journey of a group of ten characters in search of an elusive Snark.[11] No one has the slightest idea what a Snark looks like. This story illustrates the axiom that we know a good or bad idea when we see it, but not until then. The informational efforts for homeland defense and civil support are still forming, but a guiding idea has not been found. How do we identify this guiding idea for organizing and synchronizing informational elements before we see it? This thesis examines the form and function of these informational elements in an effort to divine what the Snark, or a cohesive informational strategy, looks like.

B. RESEARCH QUESTION

What policy will allow for the optimal organization and synchronization of informational elements (PA and IO) that will enable them to communicate effectively in support of homeland defense and civil support?

- What are the functions of PA and IO as informational elements?

  - The functions of PA and IO are rooted in the individual nature and culture of each discipline. Understanding these natures and cultures will aid in aligning them into a cohesive strategy.

- What are the barriers to the integration and synchronization of PA and IO?

  - The very nature of PA and IO form the barriers, and therefore the challenges, in the PA-IO interaction that might limit implementation of a cohesive strategy.

- What recommendations concerning policy, doctrine, and culture will allow for optimal organization and synchronization of PA and IO?

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[11] Carroll, *The Hunting of the Snark*, 17–19.

- Understanding natures, cultures, barriers, and options creates choices. These choices must work seamlessly together to ensure effective operations within the information environment.

C. METHODOLOGY AND OUTLINE

Chapter II is a literature review that describes the information environment, information, PA, IO, Strategic Communication (SC) and the PA-IO interface. These are examined for the contributions and challenges each brings to the problem. Additionally, selected organizational design and complexity theory literature is summarized as it relates to the tension between organizational elements. The literature review also provides a picture of ideal practices. Chapter III includes interviews of personnel from the Joint Forces Command and Joint Information Operations Warfare Command, who understand the broader practice of PA, IO, and SC within the Department of Defense (DoD), and bring a real-world context to these practices. These interviews describe the collective DoD experience and acquired knowledge in this area. Other interviews include those with North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) personnel who practice PA, IO, and SC for homeland defense and civil support operations.

Chapter IV analyzes the data of the previous two chapters. It puts forth the argument for why the organization and synchronization of informational elements is needed. Following the argument and analysis, the Galbraith Star Model provides a means to place properly aligned organizational and synchronized segments in a cohesive strategy.[12] It will present "a systematic diagnosis of

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[12] Jay R. Galbraith, *Designing Organizations: An Executive Briefing on Strategy, Structure and Process* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey–Bass Publishers, 2002), in "Building Collaborative Capacity: An Innovative Strategy for Homeland Security Preparedness," *Innovation through Collaboration: Advances in Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams*, Susan Page Hocevar, Gail Fann Thomas, and Erik Jansen, 12, ed. Michael Beyerlein (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier Ltd., 2006), 259.

organizational factors that both enhance and impede collaboration, while also guiding action toward improved collaborative capacity."[13]

The final chapter includes policy recommendations concerning the optimal organization and synchronization of the information elements to support homeland defense and civil support operations.

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[13] Susan Page Hocevar, Gail Fann Thomas, and Erik Jansen, "Building Collaborative Capacity: An Innovative Strategy for Homeland Security Preparedness," in *Innovation through Collaboration: Advances in Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams*, 12, ed. Michael Beyerlein (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier Ltd., 2006), 259.

II. MAPPING THE ENVIRONMENT

Other maps are such shapes, with their islands and capes!
But we've got our brave Captain to thank:
(So the crew would protest) that he's bought us the best—
A perfect and absolute blank![14]

Like the brave Captain in the quote above, it might be easier to start with a blank map and re-envision how information elements might be synchronized and organized. Public Affairs (PA) and Information Operations (IO) have developed doctrines and policies concerning their function, process, organization, and interaction with each other and with other elements, like Public Diplomacy and Senior Leadership Engagement. Likewise, the information environment and information have well-established definitions within the Department of Defense. This chapter reviews relevant doctrine, policy, and literature about the information environment, information, PA, IO and Strategic Communication (SC) to discern the definition and nature of these areas. Other selected literature about organizational design and complexity are reviewed to support the analysis that will be presented later in this thesis.

A. THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

The DoD definition of the information environment reads as follows: "The aggregate of the individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate and act on information."[15]

Figure 1 illustrates the information environment as being a combination of people, places, and things that do something with information. This is a simple view of the information environment, and is a starting point for any discussion about it. The nature of this environment can be understood by examining its dimensions, domains, information superiority, and complex adaptive systems.

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[14] Carroll, *The Hunting of the Snark*, 56.

[15] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations (*2006), I–1.

Figure 1.   Breakdown of the Definition of the Information Environment[16]

1.   Dimensions of the Information Environment

The Joint Publication 3–13 doctrine describes the three dimensions of the information environment: physical, informational, cognitive. The physical dimension contains the people, places, and things that have the information. The informational dimension consists of the data or information itself. The cognitive dimension represents the intangibles about information, and is often understood as the matter in the mind.[17] The dimensions create a construct in which people, places, and things interact with information. The dimensions also point to the pervasive and global nature of the information environment.

2.   Domain and Environment

The information environment can be understood by comparing it to a domain. Domains provide a means to understand the conduct of operations. Domains are defined by their physical characteristics. These characteristics can be as follows:

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[16] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations* (2006), I–1.

[17] Ibid., I–1–I–2.

> …terrain (including urban settings), weather, topography, hydrology, electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, and environmental conditions in the operational area; distances associated with the deployment to the operational area and employment of forces and other joint capabilities; the location of bases, ports, and other supporting infrastructure; and both friendly and adversary forces and other capabilities.[18]

Land, air, maritime, and space are accepted as domains in U.S. military doctrine. For example, one can distinguish the land domain from the air domain because each has definable and distinct properties. However, these properties cannot be applied to the information environment. Instead, the information environment acts as "a pervasive backdrop" to the domains,[19] meaning that its characteristics do not adhere to those of a domain. Information can exist throughout any domain. These characteristics distinguish the information environment from the domains.

3. Superiority, Supremacy and Dominance

Every military commander desires to obtain superiority or supremacy in operations. In military terms, maritime superiority, air superiority, and space superiority are defined by the degree of dominance in a given domain in a battle of one force over another. Supremacy is defined by the degree of superiority wherein the opposing force is incapable of effective interference in that domain. While dominance is not defined in military doctrine, it can be construed from this construct as control over a domain. Interestingly, land or military superiority in U.S. military doctrine is never defined.[20]

The links between superiority, supremacy, and dominance can be viewed as similar to the links between distance, velocity, and acceleration. Each one builds on the previous piece. In basic physics, distance is a simple measure from

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[18] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–0 Joint Operations*, II–21.

[19] Ibid., I–22.

[20] Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 1–02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (as amended through May 30, 2008) (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2001), 28, 262, 305, 330, 346, 506.

point A to point B. Velocity is the measure of the time required to cover a distance, or simply distance divided by time. Acceleration is the measure of the rate of change in velocity or distance divided by time. In a similar fashion, dominance can be correlated to the control of a domain. Superiority equates to the degree of dominance. Supremacy equates to the degree of superiority. Each measure is connected as part of a qualitative measure of control of a domain. Lesser degrees of control over a domain increase risk in achieving operational objectives and ultimately mission accomplishment. While distance, velocity and acceleration are quantifiable, dominance, superiority, and supremacy are subjective.

4. Information Superiority

Doctrine defines information superiority as follows:

> The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same.[21]

This definition does not focus on the degree of control of a domain. Instead, it is a subjective measure of one's advantage versus another's forces. This definition points to the pervasive and complex characteristics of the information environment by describing it in different terms than other domains. To add to its differences, military doctrine never defines information supremacy or information dominance.[22] Doctrine makes the point that, unlike domains, the information environment cannot be controlled.

5. Information Environment as a Complex Adaptive System

The information environment can be viewed as a complex adaptive system. Edward Smith defines a complex adaptive system as one that "internally

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[21] Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 1–02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 262.

[22] Ibid.

changes unpredictably and also adapts to its external environment in similarly unpredictable ways."[23] Considering this view, an informational action works simultaneously in multiple and unexpected ways.[24] This model reinforces the pervasive nature of the information environment while demonstrating the complexity of it. Joint Publication 3–0 and 3–13 both acknowledge this complexity by describing the information environment as dynamic, transcendent, and pervasive.[25] The information environment can exist in any domain and is global. The rise of global communications, the Internet and around-the-clock news convey the immediacy, complexity, pervasiveness, and dynamics of the environment. Essentially, current doctrine portrays the information environment as complex, pervasive, and global in nature.

B.   INFORMATION

Information flows like water or energy within the information environment. The DoD defines information as "1) the facts or data in any medium or form; 2) the meaning that a human assigns to data by means of known conventions used in their representations."[26] The first definition conveys a simple understanding of information. The second definition forms the critical center of what informational elements work to accomplish. Every communication focuses on the meaning assigned with the goal of either informing or influencing. Public Affairs focuses its activity on informing an audience.[27] Information Operations focuses on affecting or influencing an audience.[28] The distinction between informing and influencing is the barrier between PA and IO.

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[23] Edward A. Smith, *Complexity, Networking, and Effects–Based Approaches to Operations* (Washington, DC: DoD/Command and Control Research Program, 2006), 41.

[24] Informational action does not mean necessarily a communication. Instead, it could be employing a show of force.

[25] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–0 Joint Operations*, I–21, 22; DoD, *Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations* (2006), III–1.

[26] DoD, *Joint Publication 1–02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 260.

[27] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs* (2005), III–20.

[28] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations* (2006), II–1.

1.   Inform versus Influence and the Smith-Mundt Act

Inform means to impart knowledge, whereas influence aims to affect or sway. The clearest difference between them comes from the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which, among a number of other laws, says that federal funds appropriated for influencing foreign audiences cannot be used to influence domestic audiences.[29] The problem with this law is the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism beyond the Congressional power over funding.[30]

The Smith-Mundt Act was developed and passed in 1948. It was designed to govern the new United States Information Agency (USIA) in its public diplomacy mission overseas.[31] The legislation was concerned with the competitive effect of a government news agency, like USIA, broadcasting within the U.S. on the fledgling U.S. media in 1948. This prohibition was intended to protect the U.S. media from government interference. Over the years, the law has been applied to the Department of State and DoD.[32] It still governs the use of funding for influencing a domestic audience.

The Smith-Mundt Act was created when little or no global communication existed. The U.S. media had limited connectivity to the events abroad. In contrast, the current environment boasts global communication and around-the-clock news services. Any communication that is directed toward a foreign audience also can be sent to a domestic audience in moments via multiple avenues of communication. Today's information elements would be challenged to communicate to a single audience. Therefore, the Smith-Mundt Act only remains valid today if one assumes there is a single intended audience for the communication.

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[29] *U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948* (or Smith Mundt Act of 1948), Public Law 402, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (January 1948).

[30] Kevin R. Kosar, *Public Relations and Propaganda: Restrictions on Executive Agency Activities* (Washington, DC: Congressional Reporting Service, 2005), CRS–5.

[31] *U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948* (or Smith Mundt Act of 1948).

[32] Ibid.

C.   PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Public Affairs (PA) doctrine originally was developed in 1997 with the broader emergence of Joint doctrine. It defined PA as "those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense." [33] The 1997 version of the PA doctrine defined command information and community relations, but lacked any clarity on public information until the 2005 version.[34] This updated version defines PA as a communication capability with a three-fold function and a potentially wide audience for its communications.[35] Figure 2 provides the definitions of each function.

Command information	Community Relations	Public Information
Communication by a military organization with service members, civilian employees, retirees and family members of the organization that creates an awareness of the organization's goals, informs them of significant developments affecting them and the organization, increases their effectiveness as ambassadors of the organization, and keeps them informed about what is going on in the organization.	Those public affairs programs which address issues of interest to the general public, business, academia, veterans and Service organizations, military-related associations, and other non-news media entities. These programs are usually associated with the interaction between US military installations and their surrounding or nearby civilian communities.	Information of a military nature, the dissemination of which through public news media is not inconsistent with security, and the release of which is considered desirable or non objectionable to the responsible releasing agency.

Figure 2.   Public Affairs Functions[36]

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[33] Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs* (Arlington, VA: Joint Staff, November 14, 1997), GL–2.

[34] Ibid.

[35] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs* (2005), III–3.

[36] Ibid., vii–xii.

These functions portray one aspect of the nature of PA, namely its organizational focus. Command information provides information to those connected to an organization. Community relations describes communications between an organization or installation and the nearby community. Public information is disseminated through the media by the releasing agency or organization. Each of these functions is grounded in the organization and its communication with a given audience. The organization's primary function drives the relationship between PA and the entity it represents.

1. Differences Between the Public Affairs Doctrine of 1997 and 2005

While the definition remains unchanged from 1997, the updated doctrine addresses several aspects not adequately discussed or mentioned at all in the 1997 doctrine. The 2005 PA doctrine spells out PA responsibilities, the fundamentals of information, target, or intended audiences, the relationship of PA and IO, access of the media, and PA in homeland defense and civil support.[37] Public Affairs in homeland defense and civil support was a new development after 2002, and represented adjustments to PA doctrine due to a new mission set. These adjustments recognize the need to integrate into a larger inter-agency structure of public information efforts. The other changes to the 2005 doctrine provide distinctions and clarity to develop the nature of PA in contrast to other organizational elements.

2. Public Affairs Responsibilities

The overall responsibilities of PA as put forth in the 2005 doctrine identify two responsibilities: "1) Using Public Affairs to support command strategy; 2) Using public information to attack an adversary's strategy."[38] This is similar to the 1998 definition of IO, which is to affect another's information while protecting your

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[37] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs* (2005), iii.

[38] Ibid., I–3–I–4.

own.[39] The one distinction here is PA's priority of responsive activity over proactive activity. This points to PA's bias toward the organization, and its support or defense of the organization's strategy.

3. Fundamentals and Principles of Information

The PA doctrine throughout speaks to providing information about an organization's activities. The doctrine avoids the idea of influence, and strictly adheres to the idea that PA only informs its audience. The Fundamentals of Information and the Principles of Information emphasize informing over influencing by directly stating that one should "tell the truth," and that "propaganda has no place in DoD PA."[40] The DoD defines propaganda as "communication designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor."[41] Understanding the importance of informing an audience versus influencing an audience helps to maintain the credibility of the organization. Maintaining this credibility recognizes a position one must defend.

Fundamentals of Information

- Tell the Truth.
- Provide Timely Information.
- Practice Security at the Source.
- Provide Consistent Information at All Levels.
- Tell the DOD Story.

Figure 3.   Fundamentals of Information[42]

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[39] DoD *Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations* (1998), I–1.

[40] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs* (2005), I–3, I–5, I–6.

[41] DoD, *Joint Publication 1–02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 439.

[42] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs* (2005), I–5–I–6.

The Fundamentals of Information, as seen in Figure 3, and the Principles of Information, as seen in Figure 4, were added to the 2005 doctrine to guide commanders in effectively employing PA.

Figure 4.   Principles of Information[43]

The fundamentals and principles of information align with the nature of PA. These two lists lie at the core of PA, and reflect its overall nature as responsive first, organizationally focused, informing, and seeking to maintain credibility. They also affirm the need for truth and avoidance of propaganda that are in line with its doctrinal view. The main concept throughout these lists of attributes is the goal of preserving the credibility of PA.

4.   Public Affairs Literature

The literature focuses on the need to make PA operational, and to make military commanders at all levels aware of PA capabilities.[44] Derik Crotts, Dawn

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[43] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs* (2005), I–3.

Cutler, and John Kirby, all PA professionals, mention PA as an operational function that has growing importance to the operational commander.[45] The literature focuses squarely on PA as an operational function, but it imparts little information as to how PA should act in this fashion. The literature recommends that leadership bring PA into the operational fold.

The literature consistently discusses how PA could perform an influence function. This would be accomplished through truthful informing of the audience.[46] Where IO sources include PA as an IO capability, PA sources throughout the literature consistently point to these elements as "separate and distinct" entities; the literature does say coordination between the two is important.[47] Kenneth Pascal makes the case for commanders understanding how capabilities of PA might support operational ends. He also examines the danger of mingling PA and IO.[48] Both the implying "informing as influence" and the "separate and distinct" threads in the literature consistently are tied to maintaining credibility.[49] Credibility is seen as the critical factor in countering

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[44] John F. Kirby, "Helping Shape Today's Battlefield: Public Affairs as an Operational Function," *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition Essays 2000*, ed. Joint Chiefs of Staff (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2000), 83.

[45] Derik W. Crotts, "Operational Implications of Public Affairs—Factors, Functions, and Challenges of the Information Battlefield" (Master's thesis, Naval War College, 2005), 13; Dawn E. Cutler, "Public Affairs: An Operational Planning Function to Safeguard Credibility and Public Opinion" (Master's thesis, Naval War College, 2004), 3; Kirby, "Helping Shape Today's Battlefield: Public Affairs as an Operational Function," 84.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Kirby, "Helping Shape Today's Battlefield: Public Affairs as an Operational Function," 93; Cutler, "Public Affairs: An Operational Planning Function to Safeguard Credibility and Public Opinion," 11. The concept of "separate and distinct" is derived from DoD Directive 5122.5, which contains the DoD Principles of Information. The words "separate and distinct" are found in the 1997 version of *JP 3–61 Joint Public Affairs* in context of PA and Psychological Operations. These words, in the same context, are again used in the 2005 version of JP 3–61.

[48] Kenneth M. Pascal, "Preparing for the "Perception" War: Why a Better Public Affairs Program is Important to the Operational Commander" (Master's thesis, Naval War College, 2004), 15.

[49] Kirby, "Helping Shape Today's Battlefield: Public Affairs as an Operational Function," 93; Pascal, "Preparing for the "Perception" War: Why a Better Public Affairs Program is Important to the Operational Commander," 11.

disinformation and building audience trust of the organization.[50] The PA literature confirms the focus of PA as providing factual information, maintaining credibility, and of being organizationally focused and defensive in nature.[51]

D.   INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Information Operations doctrine was created in 1998.[52] The original definition of IO read, "… actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems."[53] This provides a simple view of IO, which is that IO gains an advantage through information. However, another aspect of the definition is that IO has two parts: offensive and defensive information operations. The 1998 doctrine codified this with separate chapters on offensive and defensive IO.[54] This created a division between the two capabilities. This defeated the purpose of the IO by simply viewing the IO actions as offensive or defensive. The divide was corrected in 2005 in the update of the doctrine. The new definition reads as follows:

> The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own.[55]

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[50] Pascal, "Preparing for the "Perception" War: Why a Better Public Affairs Program is Important to the Operational Commander," 11; Michael Perini, "Public Communications: Vital Link to Maintaining the Public's Trust during Crisis," *Threats at our Threshold*, ed. Bert B. Tussing (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), 210.

[51] Pascal, "Preparing for the "Perception" War: Why a Better Public Affairs Program is Important to the Operational Commander," 3; Henry L. Huntley, "The Role of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in the Global War on Terrorism" (Master's thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2005), 3; Michele Tasista, "Global Media and Public Affairs Communications in a New Era of Defense: The War against Terrorism" (Master's thesis, University of Colorado, 2002), 84.

[52] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations* (1998), vii.

[53] Ibid., I–1.

[54] Ibid., vii.

[55] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations* (2006), I–1.

1. Capability Focus of Information Operations

Information Operations integrates capabilities. It moves beyond an offensive- or defensive-only view, allowing these integrated capabilities to be used either offensively or defensively. The IO definition specifies the core capabilities.[56] This has bound the nature of IO into these capabilities. The capability list acts as a resource list for the development of requirements. The upfront focus on individual capabilities ignores achieving an operational effect by integrating the full spectrum kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities together. The doctrine of IO is concerned with the employment of capabilities first. In practice, the desired effect is considered first. Then capabilities are matched and integrated to meet the desired effect, for example, dropping PSYOP leaflets in Iraq to encourage surrender prior to the U.S. invasion in 2003.

2. Audience Focus of Information Operations

The definition points to an audience, namely the adversary. An adversarial audience is consistent with the influence function of IO, but in practice IO also regularly communicates with neutral and friendly audiences. This definition limits the possibilities and does not reflect the realities of practicing IO. The majority of intended audiences worldwide are related to peacekeeping and stabilization operations.[57] For example, current operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and the former Yugoslavia have influence communications aimed at neutral and friendly foreign audiences.

3. Task Focus of Information Operations

The definition contains a task list, specifically to influence, corrupt, disrupt, and usurp. It defines specific tasks, again ignoring the broader possibilities of

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[56] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations* (2006), I–1.

[57] Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC) Subject Matter Expert in discussion with author, July 1, 2008.

information operations integrating all capabilities focused on the desired effect. Considering the potential audiences of IO, influencing, corrupting, disrupting, and usurping of neutral and friendly audiences are not likely tasks.

Another job identified on the task list is to "usurp." Simply defined, usurp is to seize and hold by force or without a legal right. The last part of the DoD definition makes the point that usurp implies an illegality of action. The flaw here lies in having an integrated set of capabilities that are concerned with actions that affect the perceptions of others. If IO actions are perceived as illegal, does that not defeat the purpose and ethics of the action itself? JP 3–13 makes this point very clearly:

> IO may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring careful review. Beyond strict compliance with legalities, US military activities in the information environment as in the physical domains are conducted as a matter of policy and societal values on a basis of respect for fundamental human rights.[58]

4. Protect Our Own Decision Making

The last part of the definition points to an aspect of the mission that is ill-considered by IO. Protection of our decision making is understood in the sense of defending the physical or information dimensions of the information environment through the practice of Computer Network Defense (CND) or Operations Security (OPSEC). The possibility here is how IO defends the cognitive dimension, i.e., protecting an audience from adversarial propaganda or incorrect information. While all capabilities can somehow protect the cognitive dimension, information will seep into it. Acknowledging that influencing the domestic audience is not legal, and that there is little difference between informing and influencing, is there then a role for IO to inform audiences as a means of protection?

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[58] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations* (2006), I–6.

5. Different View of the Definition of Information Operations

Figure 5 shows the British and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) definitions of IO. Both the UK and NATO definitions begin with coordinated activities.

British Definition	NATO Definition
Coordinated actions undertaken to influence an adversary or potential adversary in support of political and military objectives by undermining his will, cohesion and decision-making ability, through affecting his information, information-based processes and systems while protecting one's own decision-makers and decision-making processes.	Coordinated actions to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other approved parties in support of Alliance overall objectives by affecting their information, information-based processes and systems while exploiting and protecting one's own.

Figure 5.   Definitions of IO[59]

This adheres to the integrated concept of IO. The audience becomes broader by mentioning adversary, potential adversary, and other leadership-approved audiences. These definitions point to the guidance of political and military objectives. The definitions also focus on a given target–the understanding and capability of an intended audience, or the will, cohesion, and decision-making ability of the intended audience. This steers clear of the U.S. focus on specific capabilities only, and aims directly at the target of IO efforts. If IO starts with the will, cohesion, or understanding of an audience, then the right combination of capabilities can be chosen to accomplish the objectives. The 1998 U.S. doctrine understood the decision-maker's mind as the ultimate target of IO.[60] While the

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[59] United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Warfare Publication 3–80 Information Operations* (Shrivenham, UK: United Kingdom Ministry of Defense, 2002), 2–1; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *AJP 3–10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations* (Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 4th Study Draft), 1–3.

[60] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations* (1998), II–1.

U.S. definition lacks the clarity of purpose for IO, the practice of IO reveals it as a coordinated set of activities targeting an audience, either to affect or protect the audience's information environment.

6.   Information Operations Literature

The focus of the literature remains in line with the IO doctrine first written in 1998, where the concepts of defensive and offensive IO capabilities were used. The 2006 update addresses the need for intertwining capabilities to support a more universal application of IO. This moves the focus away from the offensive and defensive view of the 1998 doctrine.[61] The literature review limits the use of sources written prior to 1998 due to shifting concepts concerning IO doctrine.

A significant thread that runs throughout the literature is the idea of IO as an umbrella over several informational capabilities that include PA.[62] Samuel Morthland puts forth a compelling discussion of the larger IO umbrella, and emphasizes the need to coordinate and synchronize all of these capabilities in order to support strategic and operational needs.[63] PA is seen as another means to execute IO. The IO literature reviewed never alludes to the misuse of PA that would definitely lead to discrediting it.[64]

Overall, the literature presents IO as operationally focused, capable of offensive and defensive action, and seeking to shape the environment to support

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[61] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations* (1998), i, iii.

[62] Samuel P. Morthland, "Information Operations: The Need for a National Strategy" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2002),13; Richard K. Dougherty and Pablo F. Mir, "Organizational Structure for Inter–Agency Information Operations" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2001), 18; Bryan R. Freeman, "The Role of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, and Psychological Operations in Strategic Information Operations" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 5.

[63] Morthland, "Information Operations: The Need for a National Strategy," 13.

[64] Freeman, "The Role of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, and Psychological Operations in Strategic Information Operations," 12; Tadd Sholtis, "Public Affairs and Information Operations: A Strategy for Success," *Air & Space Power Journal* XIX, no. 3, (2005): 99.

the strategic/operational requirement.[65] This view typically entails the use of information in any means, proactive or defensive, to support policy or operations.[66] The literature focuses on the larger possibilities of IO, if decision makers truly understood its full potential. The literature rarely considers the limitations that are imposed on the practice of IO within the homeland and toward friendly foreign audiences.

E.   "SEPARATE AND DISTINCT"—WHERE PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS DO NOT MEET

To this point, this literature review has discussed the nature of PA and IO based on their separate doctrines. Both doctrines clearly articulate the relationship between PA and IO. In 1997, IO doctrine was undefined due to IO being a recently invented term.[67] The 1997 PA doctrine defined the distinctive function of PA, and mentioned the need for separation when discussing PA and civil military operations, public diplomacy and psychological operations. Despite this separation, PA doctrine recognizes the need for adequate coordination to ensure credibility with the audience.[68]

The 1998 IO doctrine never mentions the importance of the separation of PA and IO, or even PSYOP. Instead, it emphasizes the close coordination and key relationship between PA and IO.[69] The latest PA (2005) and IO (2006)

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[65] Freeman, "The Role of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, and Psychological Operations in Strategic Information Operations," 8; Morthland, "Information Operations: The Need for a National Strategy," 12.

[66] Morthland, "Information Operations: The Need for a National Strategy," 17; Paul S. Warren, "A New Kind of War: Adaptive Threat Doctrine and Information Operations" (Master's thesis, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2001), 8.

[67] NORAD USNORTHCOM Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, April 18, 2008.

[68] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs*, III–18, III–19.

[69] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations* (1998), II–6.

doctrines define the PA-IO relationship. The language in both doctrines explains the necessity of separating them.[70] The following statement represents the core understanding of this guidance.

> Although both PA and IO require planning, message development and media analysis, the efforts differ with respect to audience, scope and intent, and must remain separate.[71]

The reason given is, again, to maintain credibility.[72]

The doctrine of "separate and distinct" creates the needed distance to allow for credibility of PA with its audiences, typically the media. This doctrine set forth between the 2005 PA doctrine and 2006 IO doctrine was preceded by a Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum that emphasized the need for commanders to keep PA and IO separate. This was seen as a reemphasizing of the separation. It also focused this separation on having distinct audiences. PA covers domestic and international audiences. IO only covers the foreign adversary audiences.[73] This audience distinction is in keeping with the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948.

The PA and IO literature focuses on primarily PA or IO, with limited discussion of mixing the two. The literature does not stray far from the "separate and distinct" doctrinal guidance.[74] The literature considers the mixing of IO into PA as diluting the credibility of PA with the media.[75] Credibility acts as the lifeblood of PA, and is apparent in the PA literature. Gary Patton put forth a clear

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[70] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs* (2005), III–20; DoD, *Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations* (2006), II–9.

[71] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs* (2005), III–20.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Department of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCS Memorandum: Policy on Public Affairs Relationship to Information Operations* (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2004).

[74] Cutler, "Public Affairs: An Operational Planning Function to Safeguard Credibility and Public Opinion," 11; Kirby, "Helping Shape Today's Battlefield: Public Affairs as an Operational Function," 93.

[75] Kirby, "Helping Shape Today's Battlefield: Public Affairs as an Operational Function," 91; Pascal, "Preparing for the "Perception" War: Why a Better Public Affairs Program is Important to the Operational Commander," 11.

sense of the PA-IO relationship, saying the credibility issue is key to how the interaction occurs.[76] This lifeblood might be seen as a challenge to how PA and IO interact. Despite "separate and distinct" means, Bryan Freeman, Gary Patton, and Tadd Sholtis all agree on the need to integrate and synchronize the two functions to support operations effectively.[77]

F.   STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION

Being able to communicate coherently and successfully to an audience with a cohesive message requires synchronization of communication efforts across the government. To achieve this, the United States government uses Strategic Communication (SC), which requires the collaboration of several government agencies, including the Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DoD) and the Broadcast Board of Governors (BBG).[78] The DOS acts as the lead agency for SC, which creates the perception that SC is based on communication for foreign audiences. Strategic Communication is comprised of both communications for foreign and domestic audiences, and serves to coordinate communication with both foreign and domestic audiences. With the news services and global communication, messages provided domestically have as much impact messages provided to foreign audiences.

Department of State has developed a strategy for public diplomacy and SC, but has never defined SC.[79] The lack of clarity about SC creates confusion,

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[76] Gary S. Patton, "Public Affairs and Information Operations: Integral or Incompatible?" (Master's thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2000), 2.

[77] Freeman, "The Role of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, and Psychological Operations in Strategic Information Operations," 1; Patton, "Public Affairs and Information Operations: Integral or Incompatible?" 14; Sholtis, "Public Affairs and Information Operations: A Strategy for Success," 102.

[78] Government Accounting Office, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Accounting Office, 2005), 7.

[79] Department of State, Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordination Committee, *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2007), 1.

and potentially could defeat the purpose of attempting to synchronize communications. The definition of SC has been nebulous to date, most notably defined by DoD in 2006 as follows:

> Focused United States processes and efforts to engage and understand key audiences to create, strengthen, and preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs and actions synchronized with other instruments of national power.[80]

Strategic Communication is not a product but rather a process by which the multitude of government organizations can integrate and synchronize communications using an orchestra of capabilities to create cohesive themes and messages that support national strategic objectives. Among those capabilities are public diplomacy, PA, and IO.[81] This is not an exhaustive list but an understood set of capabilities. Any capability (a message or an action) supporting the objective is a capability that supports SC. In this construct, SC cannot be viewed as a peer of PA and IO, but rather an overarching process.[82]

Strategic Communication remains a relatively new concept in the government and the military. The SC literature provides a wide view of what it could be and where it should develop. The current literature of SC resembles that of IO prior to 1998, which used conflicting terms and concepts that left the true course of IO in doubt. Once the 1998 doctrine was developed, the literature could derive from that doctrinal baseline, and propose different views and directions for IO. The SC literature focused on the Defense Science Board (DSB) reports of

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[80] Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, *2006 Quadrennial Defense Report Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006), 3.

[81] Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, *Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication* (Washington, DC: Defense Science Board, 2004), 6.

[82] Matt Armstrong, interview by author, October 21, 2008. Matt Armstrong is an advocate of public diplomacy and has written extensively on public diplomacy, Information Operations, Public Affairs, and the Smith Mundt Act.

2001, 2004 and 2008.[83] The imperative is the need for national policy and definition. The lack of the national SC policy and definition lends itself to a fragmentary SC effort. Bryan Freeman states that the current application of PA, PSYOP, and public diplomacy are fragmentary and diffuse.[84] For effective SC, these elements must be synchronized and coordinated.[85] The DSB report, titled "Managed Information Dissemination," recommends that the U.S. government speak with a common voice (i.e., Strategic Communication), and identifies several ways to organize and change policy to accommodate this recommendation.[86] Overall, the literature of SC does not address the clash of cultures between PA and IO.

Strategic Communication is based on the concept of communicating in support of the national strategic objectives laid out in the National Security Strategy.[87] Two documents describe what SC should be. The first is the DSB Task Force report published in 2008. The DSB Task Force recognizes SC as a key element to support national power by preventing and limiting conflicts and enhancing responses. The task force views SC as a dynamic process with critical responsibilities at the upper levels of government. Strategic Communication, in the opinion of the task force, is conducted through strong adaptive networks within government and between government and civil society. Strategic

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[83] Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, *Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination* (Washington, DC: Defense Science Board, 2001), 1–7; Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, *Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication* (Washington, DC: Defense Science Board, September 2004), 1–9; Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, *Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication* (Washington, DC: Defense Science Board, 2008), ix–xxi.

[84] Freeman, "The Role of Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, and Psychological Operations in Strategic Information Operations," 1.

[85] Patton, "Public Affairs and Information Operations: Integral or Incompatible?" 2.

[86] DoD, *Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination*, 3–4.

[87] Department of State, Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordination Committee, *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2007), 2.

Communication requires the same level of transformation that government has employed in transforming intelligence, defense, and homeland security.[88] The task force determined that success in SC depends on:

- Need for better understanding of cultures and attitudes;

- Leadership understanding that actions mean more than words;

- Better understood structures between elements of the government and civil society; and

- A solid model of guidance that is flexible and transforms current structures into adaptive structures for the future.[89]

The other report of consequence is the Government Accountability Office's 2006 report on U.S. public diplomacy. The report points out several efforts by the White House to promote public diplomacy efforts through the establishment of offices with public diplomacy responsibilities, and the development of strategies to promote such efforts. It notes most significantly that no national communication strategy has been developed. According to the report, the goal of public diplomacy is to improve understanding of the U.S. and to counter misinformation. The report also calls for transformation in public diplomacy based on its increasing importance. The report urges high-level leadership involvement in SC, structural changes in the government to enhance SC mechanisms, and better coordination among SC stakeholders.[90]

The lack of a single government definition and general SC policy allows for broad interpretation of SC. Potentially, the lack of policy is evidence of the embryonic and developing nature of SC. It was developed as a process to drive synchronization of multiple efforts, and as a bridge to an organic and natural communication effort born out of planning or operations.

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[88] DoD, *Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication* (2004), v.

[89] Ibid., x.

[90] Government Accounting Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy (Washington, DC: GAO, April 2005), 2–5.

The tension between PA and IO highlights the difficulty in fully synchronizing SC, and may be a contributing factor to the temporary nature of SC. The PA doctrine calls for separation from IO, PSYOP and public diplomacy.[91] This doctrinal position is in contrast to the goal of SC. While synchronization is possible, it remains inefficient in execution. This inefficiency is linked to endangering the credibility of PA by its connection to another element. Public Affairs depends on being credible in its communication with the media. Information Operations capabilities are perceived as not truthful in their execution. This perception forces PA to need separation and distinction from IO.[92]

The principles of SC exist as its only policy. This portrays the SC concepts discussed above, and adds a set of principles as seen in Figure 6 that frame the conduct of SC.

Figure 6.   Principles of Strategic Communication[93]

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[91] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs* (2005), III–17, III–20, III–21.

[92] Ibid., III–20.

[93] Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Joint Communication, *Principles of Strategic Communication* (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2008).

The principles represent a leap forward for SC. Leadership is the first principle, and points to the need for top-down leadership and guidance in the SC process. "Credible" validates the doctrinal call for separation between elements. "Pervasive" points to an understanding of the global information environment. "Unity of effort" underpins the basic premise of SC. "Responsive," as indicated here, concerns sending the right message to the right audience at the right time. It also implies responding to communications, which requires a balance of proactive and responsive actions. "Responsive" could imply that the U.S. is not proactively communicating.

Most of these principles guide SC in a correct direction, but they lack any defined authority to direct the elements or to compel synchronization under an SC process. Therefore, the principles cannot be viewed as enough to change the nature or the culture of the informational elements.

G.   ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

1.   The Star Model

Jay Galbraith and Amy Kates's Star Model is a means to examine the interrelated pieces of an organizational design. Its structure can incorporate the complexity of the information environment and the elements. As an organizational design framework, the Star Model specifies five capabilities that guide high performance: strategy, structure, process, rewards, and people (Figure 7).[94]

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[94] Amy Kates and Jay R. Galbraith, *Designing Your Organization: Using The Star Model to Solve 5 Critical Design Challenges* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey–Bass, 2007), 2–3.

Figure 7.   The Star Model[95]

The capabilities are the core of the strategy. "Structure" is based on where the formal decision making, authority, and power are located for an activity. "Process" describes the flow of information during an activity. "Rewards" relate to the motivation and values of the people involved in the activity. "People" describes the development of the personnel who accomplish the activity. The benefit of using this model is that it provides a means to examine distinct, interrelated aspects of an organizational design without focusing solely on structure.[96]

2.   Characteristic Considerations for a Cohesive Strategy

The literature identifies a wide range of characteristics for a cohesive informational strategy. Thomas Davenport and Laurence Prusak provide a view on characteristics that create friction in and among organizations, as noted in Figure 8. These characteristics reinforce the need for credibility/trust, understanding other cultures, and limiting firewalls between groups.

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[95] Kates and Galbraith, *Designing Your Organization: Using the Star Model to Solve 5 Critical Design Challenges*, 2–3.

[96] Ibid., 2–3, 8–9, 16–17, 21–23.

Friction Characteristics
- Lack of trust
- Different cultures, vocabularies and frames of reference
- Lack of time and meeting places
- Status and rewards go only to knowledge owners
- Lack of absorptive capacity in recipients
- Belief that knowledge is prerogative of specific groups
- Intolerance for mistakes or need for help

Figure 8.   Friction Characteristics[97]

Galbraith and Kates put forth several characteristics to consider when designing a strategy for an organization; they specifically identify coherence, active leadership, reconfigurability, and clarity of interfaces. "Coherence" implies a common direction in the organization. "Active leadership" provides the direction and guidance to create decision frameworks for effective operations and choices. "Reconfigurability" posits that an organization must be able to change as fast internally as the external environment changes. "Clarity of interfaces" relate to having a basic and clear means to coordinate and interact within an organization.[98]

Joint Publication 5–0's Joint Operation Planning says that a course of action can be evaluated based on adequacy, acceptability, feasibility, and completeness.[99] Each of these criteria has some context in the organization and synchronization discussion. Two in particular are of interest in evaluating any informational strategy. They are acceptability and feasibility.[100] "Acceptability" relates to the acceptable cost and proportionality of the course of action in accomplishing the mission. "Feasibility" implies the ability to undertake a course

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[97] Thomas H. Davenport and Laurence Prusak, *Working Knowledge: How Organizations Manage What They Know* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1998), 95–96.

[98] Kates and Galbraith, *Designing Your Organization: Using the Star Model to Solve 5 Critical Design Challenges,* 23–25.

[99] Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 5–0 Joint Operation Planning* (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2006), III–28.

[100] Ibid. Adequacy relates to how the course of action meets the scope and guidance of an operation. Completeness relates to the incorporation of all tasks to complete the plan. These characteristics are not critical to synchronizing informational elements.

of action.[101] Considering the current doctrine and policy, any strategy must find a balance or acceptability among all of the informational elements. The elements must then be able to engage the strategy and act.

H. COMPLEXITY

The information environment is characterized as a complex adaptive system based on the definition provided by Edward Smith, as mentioned earlier. Any strategy for organizing and synchronizing informational elements must consider the complexity of the information environment.

1. What is Complexity?

Charles Perrow in *Normal Accidents* describes complex as "interactions in an unexpected sequence," as opposed to linear events, which he defines as "interactions in an expected sequence."[102] Smith conveys his understanding of complexity by defining what is complicated in comparison to what is complex. His analogy is that of a modern car (complicated). One can explain in a linear fashion how the complicated car will react based on pressing down on the accelerator. If the car is complex, the outcome would be unpredictable; i.e., the car would contain several interdependent parts that would interact in unpredictable ways. Smith posits that these complex interactions hold the promise of solving new challenges.[103] According to Robert Alexrod and Michael Cohen, complexity focuses on strategy or agent interaction, strategy variation and the selection of successful strategies, and the continual interplay of these parts.[104]

Smith gives this view on complex adaptive systems.

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[101] Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 5–0 Joint Operation Planning*, III–28.

[102] Charles Perrow, *Normal Accidents: Living with High–Risk Technologies* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1984), 78.

[103] Smith, *Complexity, Networking, and Effects–Based Approaches to Operations,* 36–40.

[104] Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen, *Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 6.

In reality, we must deal not just with a complex system but with a complex adaptive system, one that not only changes unpredictably, but also adapts to its external environment in similarly unpredictable ways.[105]

The complex adaptive system has a set of interrelated parts. Each of these parts can act as autonomous agents that through their respective actions can impact other agents. These interactions define the system. The agents can act in expected patterns (complicated) or challenge those patterns (complex).[106] The complicated car will always accelerate when one presses down on the accelerator. The complex car could explode when one presses down on the accelerator.

2.   Implications of Complexity and Complex Adaptive Systems

The informational activities or even the kinetic activities within the information environment have unpredictable effects on other actors, just as their activities act unpredictably on us. Public Affairs and IO, both informational elements, must act and interact in this complex adaptive system. Both PA and IO encompass multiple interdependent parts that interact with other parts. Information Operations attempts to integrate its core related and supporting capabilities into operations, and potentially communicate to foreign audiences. Public Affairs interacts with internal, external, foreign, and domestic audiences through multiple capabilities. Public Affairs and IO could be considered complex systems. As complex systems, they interact within a command in a complex manner, and take action externally in a complex environment. Any organizing and synchronizing strategy thus developed must embrace the complexity of the entire system. An understanding of complexity, of complex adaptive systems, and of the information environment will enable more effective informational activities.

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[105] Smith, *Complexity, Networking, and Effects–Based Approaches to Operations,* 41.
[106] Ibid.

The mapped environment provides a landscape of challenges to organizing and synchronizing informational elements. The information environment is characterized as pervasive, global, and complex in nature. Information and the elements relate based on the divide between an activity being informing or influencing. Public Affairs seeks to maintain credibility by providing truthful information to any audience to create a positive image of its organization. Information Operations doctrine and practice limit clarity in implementing and synchronizing IO. Public Affairs-Information Operations interaction is governed by the need for credibility. This need creates a barrier for synchronizing and organizing informational elements. Strategic Communications provides a potential path through that barrier. However, the lack of definition and authority limit its real impact on informational elements. The environment mapped is challenging and extremely complex for organization and synchronization of these elements. The mapped environment requires a complex model and the Star Model best suits this analysis and alignment of organizational and synchronization demands.

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III. DISCERNING THE HORIZON THROUGH INTERVIEWS

> He was thoughtful and grave—but the orders he gave
> Were enough to bewilder a crew.
> When he cried "Steer to starboard, but keep her head larboard!"
> What on earth was the helmsman to do?[107]

The environment mapped in the literature review requires a real-world context to discern the horizon of policy, doctrine, practice, and the informational elements. This section melds together interviews with subject matter experts covering the areas of the information environment, information, Public Affairs (PA) and Information Operations (IO) and Strategic Communication (SC). The interviews were conducted over the course of several months in 2008. These were guided discussions that allowed the interviewees to respond in an open forum based on their knowledge and experiences concerning the informational elements, how PA and IO interact, how the elements should be organized, and who should lead a synchronized informational effort.

The names of the individuals for all but the last interview have been withheld to allow for a free flowing discussion of experience and knowledge. The first interview included three individuals from North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). The group included an active-duty public affairs officer, a reserve public affairs officer and information operations analyst, and a former psychological operations (PSYOP) officer who currently works as a strategic communication planner. The second interview was with an individual from the Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC). The individual was a trained PYSOP officer who currently acts as an IO and SC planner. This individual interacts regularly with USNORTHCOM, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Strategic Command. This individual also spent time in Iraq, once as an IO/PSYOP officer and later as an SC planner. The third interview was with an individual who served three years at

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107 Carroll, *The Hunting of the Snark*, 57.

the Joint Warfighting Center (JFWC). This individual's duties were related to the conduct of SC, PA, and IO with several combatant commands. Combatant commands serve as joint service strategic commands for either a geographic region (North America) or functional area (special operations). This individual provided firsthand knowledge of the organization and synchronization of PA and IO across the DoD. The final interview was with Matt Armstrong, who has written and speaks extensively concerning national communication efforts, specifically public diplomacy and strategic communication.

In the course of the discussions, several themes emerged that expanded the literature review to include the aim of informational activities, the lack of coordination between PA and IO, the need for credibility, and SC policy and authority. The experts provided a well-rounded set of attributes and skills concerning persons who might lead and synchronize PA and IO in a combatant command.

A.   AIM OF INFORMATIONAL ACTIVITIES

During the course of reviewing documents and the interview with Armstrong, one issue about informational activities became apparent. What is the aim of our activities? Informational types would say that we are attempting to win hearts and minds. Armstrong, in his writings and during the interview, made the point that this is the wrong aim. If informational activities are to provide information with the intent of changing a behavior or the action of someone, then the objective should be to struggle for the "minds and wills" of the audience. Word choice matters in informational activities. One must carefully consider the desired outcome, and develop objectives and corresponding action accordingly.[108]

Armstrong contends that winning the hearts and minds of an audience lends itself to a beauty-contest mentality. The end state asks the question: Do

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[108] Armstrong, interview by author, 2008.

you like me? This mentality aims at making the world resemble America. Instead, Armstrong suggests the struggle for minds and wills, which should ask the question: Can we coexist? The informational activities should aim at creating an end state where the global community can coexist, and that allows us to achieve other goals without interference. This twist on word choice displays the complexity of action and engagement in the global information environment.[109]

B.   LACK OF COORDINATION BETWEEN PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

In the previous chapter, doctrine pointed to the separation between PA and IO. The experts interviewed agree that doctrinal concepts have led to cultural differences, i.e., the culture at the operational to tactical (lower) levels is different from the culture at the strategic/departmental (higher) levels. These differences are, by all accounts, surmountable at the tactical and operational levels, but almost impossible to overcome at the strategic and department levels. The reason for the barriers at the higher levels, according to the interviewees, is due to ownership (policy direction) and resourcing (funding and manpower) issues. At the higher levels, delineation of responsibilities and meager resources create barriers that restrain integration of PA and IO. The restraint rises out of a fear of losing resources or responsibilities. The tension or barriers at the lower levels are surmountable due to the proximity to mission accomplishment. The tension is focused on overlapping audiences (foreign and domestic). The foreign and domestic audiences are different. PA can communicate with both; IO only can communicate with foreign audiences.[110] IO doctrine focuses on the adversary.[111] Information Operations practice demonstrates that non-adversarial foreign audiences are a key audience. The distinction between audiences creates the

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[109] Armstrong, interview by author, 2008.

[110] NORAD USNORTHCOM Subject Matter Experts A, B and C, interview by author, May 23, 2008; JIOWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008; JFWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, July 24, 2008.

[111] *Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations* (2006), 8.

most difficult barrier between PA and IO, and stems from the perceived difference between informing and influencing. The tension between PA and IO, regardless of the level, breeds inefficient operations. If both PA and IO cannot agree and cooperate, informational activities and operations suffer. All of the interviews bore out that once PA and IO get past the doctrinal issues that separate them, the relationship between them has the potential to work well.[112]

The PA professionals discussed the culture of PA as special, citing its close relationship with its commander.[113] They also saw PA as separate, relating to the doctrinal view put forth by Joint Publication 3–61.[114] This cultural view creates a tendency, as one PA professional stated, toward working alone. According to one of the experts, PA in the past would not consider coordinating with or maintaining the visibility of IO. Yet this same expert stated that IO is likely PA's biggest operational advocate. Public Affairs in a combatant command works directly for the commander as a special staff advisor. PA lacks an operational credibility. Information Operations can validate PA activities as operationally necessary. Recent combat camera employment by IO at USNORTHCOM was cited as a recent validation of PA requirements for coverage of fighting wild land fires in late 2008.[115] While this one area points to the possibilities of coordination, the current PA-IO barriers limit this potential.

C.   NEED FOR CREDIBILITY

Public Affairs doctrine and professionals speak to the need for credibility.[116] Credibility for any communicator equates to trust from an audience and success in communication. For PA, credibility is maintained by being

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[112] NORAD USNORTHCOM Subject Matter Experts A, B and C, interview by author, 2008; JIOWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008; JFWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008.

[113] Ibid.

[114] Ibid.; DoD, *Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs* (2005), III–20.

[115] NORAD USNORTHCOM Subject Matter Expert A and C, interview by author, 2008.

[116] Ibid., *Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs* (2005), III–20.

trustworthy to an audience. The separations within doctrine all cite maintaining credibility for PA.[117] All of the experts interviewed agree that PA needs credibility, but they also saw the same need in all other informational elements.[118] During a presentation to the DoD's Visual Information Workshop 2008, Rear Admiral Frank Thorpe, the current chief of naval information, stated that he had never met a "PSYOP'er" (Psychological Operations Personnel) who was not worried about credibility.[119] The Joint Information Operations Warfare Command subject matter expert stated that the importance of credibility, while important, is exaggerated by the PA community. In his words, PA works for DoD like any other element; however, its relationship with the media is biased because its message is perceived by the media as being the voice of DoD. Since perception is reality in the information environment, being credible is critical. That credibility may be undermined because the message will always be geared toward achieving DoD strategic goals."[120]

D.   STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION POLICY AND AUTHORITY

Armstrong uses the analogy of an orchestra when discussing SC: If one envisions an orchestra, every instrument is working in concert with all the other instruments to create a structured blend. Every instrument must do exactly its part for the music to work. Otherwise, the effort lacks synergy or harmony, and is ruined. In contrast, Armstrong said, imagine SC as a jazz ensemble. The jazz ensemble is a flexible and adaptable construct; the music is dependent on the agreement of the players as the music is being played. One player can stray from the dominant theme without destroying the music. In fact, if straying is more

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[117] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs* (2005), III–20.

[118] NORAD USNORTHCOM Subject Matter Expert A, B and C, interview by author, 2008; JIOWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008; JFWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008.

[119] Admiral Frank Thorpe, *Proceedings of the Department of Defense Visual Information Workshop 2008* (Baltimore, MD, April 21–25, 2008).

[120] JIOWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008.

attractive, the entire ensemble can follow suit.[121] This analogy is much more suited to the pervasive and complex nature of the information environment that the informational elements must face together. The only counter to this analogy lies in the seemingly unstructured and random nature of the jazz ensemble, where the players must understand their instrument and create relationships that will ensure a coherent effort.

The orchestra construct of SC depends on the authority of the conductor over the musicians. The jazz ensemble construct also requires guidance and direction, even if the outcome is unknown. However, SC lacks the authority to be a synchronizing force for informational activities. The lack of SC policy means there is no adequate mechanism to motivate or direct the informational elements beyond their existing doctrine and culture. All of the experts interviewed agreed that leadership is the critical factor that currently is lacking in executing the SC process.[122]

E.   LEADERSHIP

Leadership was understood by all of the interviewees to be the key ingredient for organizing and synchronizing multiple informational efforts. The leader must have some ability to navigate all of the capabilities while ensuring the application of the right capabilities in the correct venues. This leader must be an "honest broker" or "tie breaker." The experts agree that this leader must understand all of the capabilities and the existing information environment.[123]

One interviewee believes that personnel with a PA background would have the requisite communication experience.[124] Some of the NORAD and

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[121] Armstrong, interview by author, 2008.

[122] Ibid., JIOWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008; JFWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008.

[123] NORAD USNORTHCOM Subject Matter Expert A, B and C, interview by author, 2008; JIOWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008; JFWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008.

[124] NORAD USNORTHCOM Subject Matter Expert C, interview by author, 2008.

USNORTHCOM interviewees believe IO personnel would have the best view of the entire informational situation.[125] Those same interviewees believe operations personnel would have the authority and understanding of how informational elements fit into the larger mission. However, each area also has serious limitations. For PA, the culture of being separate and of having a special relationship to the combatant commander would hinder the balancing of and optimal use of all the informational elements. For IO, the limitation in leading informational elements would be the perceived stigma of deception and psychological operations that can impact credibility. This would hinder the integration with other elements. The director of operations needs to be in the chain for these activities, according to one source, but not directly in charge of them.[126]

The ideal candidate would be, according to multiple sources, a solid staff officer and a communication-savvy operator with a planning background.[127] This leader would need rank equal or higher than the respective PA and IO chiefs.[128] The experts with a public affairs background leaned toward an experienced PA person. However, one clarified that any PA person in this arrangement would have to be divorced of the current PA culture. Otherwise, the effort would have a distinct PA focus, which would limit the application of other elements to their full potential, and likely maintain the separation between elements.[129] This leader would require the following traits.[130]

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[125] NORAD USNORTHCOM Subject Matter Expert A and B, interview by author, 2008; JIOWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008; JFWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008.

[126] NORAD USNORTHCOM Subject Matter Expert A, B and C, interview by author, 2008.

[127] Ibid., JIOWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008; JFWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008; Armstrong, interview by author, 2008.

[128] JFWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008.

[129] NORAD USNORTHCOM Subject Matter Expert A, interview by author, 2008.

[130] NORAD USNORTHCOM Subject Matter Expert A, B and C, interview by author, 2008; JIOWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008; JFWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008; Armstrong interview, 2008.

- Broad understanding of informational elements
- Solid communication skills
- Well-rounded staffing ability
- Extensive planning and operational background

These skills would provide the ability to create a plan and a vision, to navigate the informational elements, act as a critical communicator for the organization, credibly advise senior leadership, and execute the plan. One expert suggested that this may require more than one person. Typically, the small SC office would contain an SC director, who would deal with the senior leadership and develop the vision for the command SC efforts, and a deputy, who would plan and execute SC within the staff and command elements. This construct allows for some variances in personnel in order to build a stronger team that can conduct the broad range of activities associated with informational activities in a combatant command.[131]

The interviews validated the real-world context of the literature review. The aim of PA and IO was defined by the interviewees as communicating the command mission and operations. This aim was modified by Armstrong in the interviews as the struggle for the collective mind and will of an audience. The reasons for the lack of PA-IO coordination are intrinsic to their nature. The interviews revealed this cultural mismatch and the missed opportunities for better coordination. Doctrine points to a barrier between PA and IO based on PA's need for credibility. However, the interviews pointed to the need for credibility by all informational activities. Strategic Communication policy reflects an ideal construct of an orchestra. Armstrong provides a more practical construct with his analogy of a jazz ensemble. Analogies aside, SC's greatest hindrance is that it lacks the authority to force any transformation of the informational elements.

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[131] JFWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008.

IV. ANALYSIS

In one moment I've seen what has hitherto been
Enveloped in absolute mystery,
And without extra charge I will give you at large
A Lesson in Natural History.[132]

The tension between Public Affairs (PA) and Information Operations (IO) is no mystery. It can be seen in the policies and practice of both elements. This tension inhibits a cohesive narrative for homeland defense and civil support. Examining the principles of war and the information environment illustrates the need for a cohesive narrative, for an organizing construct, and a synchronizing force for informational elements. The principles of war are time-tested principles that lead to effective operations, if followed. The information environment is the space where PA and IO operate. Any informational organizing and synchronizing strategy must engage the information environment, and adhere to the principles of war. Otherwise, the existing tension between elements will continue.

A. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Joint doctrine recognizes the principles of war, and includes them in the Joint Publication 3–0 Joint Operations.[133] Army doctrine, the source for the principles of war for Joint doctrine, states that the principles of war are vital to "operating successfully across the military spectrum," and that they form the bedrock of Army doctrine.[134] Three principles form underlying proof concerning the need to organize and synchronize PA and IO, namely unity of effort, mass, and economy of force. Each of these principles will be defined. Then each one

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[132] Carroll, *The Hunting of the Snark* , 80.

[133] DoD, *Joint Publication 3–0 Joint Operations*, A–1.

[134] Department of Defense, Headquarters Department of the Army, *FM 3–0 Operations* (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2001), 4–11–4–12.

will point to a task related to organizing and synchronizing PA and IO. Finally, the current state of the mapped environment is examined in connection to the principle.

1.   Unity of Effort

Unity of command or effort seeks to gain a unified direction or coordination through cooperation and common interests to achieve the commander's objective.[135] Specifically, this principle points to the need for synchronizing the activities of PA and IO. Public Affairs and IO are governed by the "separate and distinct" guidance. The concept of "separate and distinct" builds credibility for PA, but comes at the cost of a barrier between PA and IO. "Separate and distinct" limits synchronization between elements and works contrary to unity of effort.

2.   Mass

Mass or force concentration seeks to gather appropriate forces to accomplish the desired effect in a timely manner. Mass points to the need for an organizing construct. The principle of mass also puts distinct elements with distinct means to tackle a given operational objective.[136] These distinct means increase the variety of potential solutions that can address the challenge. In applying mass, however, no organizing authority exists to move PA and IO to mass effects. Loosely applying Newton's first law of motion, PA and IO will continue to act in their nature unless acted upon by an external force. Although SC could be the process where this authority resides, no policy empowers that authority.

3.   Economy of Force

Economy of force seeks to allocate only the essential force that is needed to achieve the objective, and does not leave any force without tasks to perform

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[135] DoD, *JP 3–0 Joint Publication 3–0 Joint Operations*, A–2.

[136] DoD, *FM 3–0 Operations* (2001), 4–13.

during the execution of operations.[137] This principle guides optimal and efficient implementation of capabilities to gain the operational objective. It also limits poor or non-employment of capabilities.

In the interviews, PA is described as being without operational credibility. This credibility is very different from the media or audience credibility created by the "separate and distinct" guidance. "Separate and distinct" guidance creates the barrier to operational credibility. In effect, PA cannot integrate easily into operations, even though the literature amply points to the need for it. The lack of integration limits optimal and efficient use of PA in operations.

Information Operations doctrine points to a much more limited view of IO execution. This focus is on specified capabilities, tasks, and a very limited audience. Doctrine guides or informs the practice of a given area to the leadership. For IO, it creates barriers to potential areas where operational advantage can be gained. Specifically, IO can apply to a wide range of capabilities, tasks, and an extended audience. The current practice of IO demonstrates its fuller potential. The mismatch between practice and doctrine works against optimal and efficient use of IO in operations.

The problem space demonstrates significant barriers and limitations. Unity of effort is hampered by the need for credibility and the "separate and distinct" guidance. Mass or force concentration is limited by the lack of authority to organize and direct the informational elements. Economy of force is illusive with both PA and IO. Public Affairs requires operational credibility. Information Operations requires clarity between its doctrine and practice.

B.   THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

The informational elements operate, synchronize, and execute in the global, pervasive, and complex information environment. The information environment is defined as "the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and

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137 DoD, *FM 3–0 Operations* (2001), 4–13.

systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information."[138] This definition points to the global and pervasive character of the information environment.[139] In describing the information environment, JP 3–13 states that the information environment is pervasive through the air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains.[140] This pervasive nature implies information can reside everywhere. This quality points to a need for cohesion or synchronization of informational efforts. Again, the concept of "separate and distinct" creates a barrier that works against the pervasive nature of the information environment. On the other hand, the global nature points to audience. This global and pervasive nature can result in a message sent to one particular audience also being received by multiple other audiences. This demonstrates the overlap that is most pronounced in communication for homeland defense and civil support. Messages for foreign audiences may actually be received by domestic audiences and vice versa. The global nature of the information environment reinforces the lack of ability to segregate audiences. Current practices do attempt to segregate audiences. Informing activities (PA) communicate to domestic and foreign audiences. Influencing activities (IO) communicate only to select foreign audiences. This segregation creates a barrier to synchronized efforts. It ignores the global nature of the information environment. Also, it potentially erodes overall credibility for the communication effort as the information crosses to unintended audiences.

As discussed in Chapter II, the information environment with its three dimensions (physical, information and cognitive) can be thought of as a complex adaptive system. This implies that the system acts in unpredictable ways internally and externally. With its three-part construct of the information environment, one might conclude that controlling the information environment is a readily attainable goal. The measure or control of this environment is defined

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138 DoD, *Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations* (2006), GL–9.

139 Ibid., I–4; DoD, *Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs* (2005), I–2.

140 DoD, *Joint Publication 3–13 Information Operations* (2006), I–1.

as information superiority, which would be the aggregate of the degree of control over the physical, information, and cognitive dimensions. Control of the cognitive dimension becomes an extremely subjective measure that is biased based on one's relative position. Hence, any measure of control of the information environment would be nebulous at best. An exploration of dominance, superiority, and supremacy within the information environment demonstrates that controlling this environment is difficult at best.

C.   ALIGNING STRATEGY FOR INFORMATIONAL ELEMENTS

> That's exactly the method, the Bellman bold in a hasty parenthesis cried, that's exactly the way I have always been told that the capture of Snarks should be tried![141]

Choices abound in policy, doctrine, and practice. As discerned from the data and analysis, the current choices have created barriers and limitations to optimal organization and synchronization. What choices in policy, doctrine, and practice align to optimize organization and synchronization? The literature review identified the Star Model as a means to align these strategic choices. It provides a feasible means of examining the variables of a strategy for organization and synchronization. This model, as reviewed, identifies five points that serve as interrelated areas of an organizing and synchronizing strategy. It encompasses a means to view people, rewards, process, structure, and capabilities. In considering a strategy for organizing and synchronizing informational efforts, the strategy must be able to handle the demands set forth by the principles of war and the nature of the information environment. The Star Model accommodates the complex environment and elements. During the data collection, cultural interaction and leadership were two significant issues that emerged, both of which can deeply affect organization and synchronization. For this analysis, the

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[141] Carroll, *The Hunting of the Snark*, 64.

Star Model will be modified to incorporate culture and leadership. Overall, this modified model (Figure 9) meets the needs of the structural demands as they are described here.

Figure 9.   Modified Star Model[142]

This data presents no clear best strategy for homeland defense and civil support. The complexity of the information environment and the elements themselves do not provide a simple means to accomplish this feat. Instead, the optimal elements are recommended based on their ability to support the principles of war, engage the information environment, enable synchronization, and reinforce organization.

1.   Capabilities

Kates and Galbraith put forth:

[142] Kates and Galbraith, *Designing Your Organization: Using the Star Model to Solve 5 Critical Design Challenges,* 2–3.

> … organizational capabilities as the unique combination of skills, processes, technologies, and human abilities that differentiate a company. They are created internally and are thus difficult for others to replicate.[143]

In this study, the organizational capabilities of PA and IO fit this definition. This study has alluded to two issues concerning capabilities: operational credibility of PA, and IO doctrine and practice. Public Affairs needs to increase operational credibility; IO can aid this operational credibility by validating PA activities in operational channels. Increasing operational credibility integrates PA as an operational function, and increases synchronization between PA and IO. For the organizational capability of IO, its doctrine needs to reflect IO practice. By aligning practice and doctrine, IO practitioners and decision makers gain clarity of purpose. This clarity allows for greater accessibility and employment for IO. Both of these actions will increase synchronization between informational elements, and reduce barriers to organization. The actions will also simplify integrating PA and IO, and support mass or force concentration. Realigning PA and IO ensures optimal force application or economy of force. Finally, these actions are conducive to the pervasive nature of the information environment.

2. People

For the Star Model, "People" implies certain practices.[144] For this analysis, it can be defined as a cross-pollination of knowledge. Information personnel require education and continuous training about other informational elements. Non-information personnel require education about these elements and how they integrate. This education and training lowers barriers between operations and informational elements, and aids in synchronization. It also enables unity of effort.

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[143] Kates and Galbraith, *Designing Your Organization: Using the Star Model to Solve 5 Critical Design Challenges,* 6.

[144] Ibid., 22.

3. Rewards

"Rewards" in the Star Model refers to behaviors that enable success, and usually take a monetary form. Considering that these elements operate in the military environment, monetary rewards are not an option. Instead, recognition and promotion are incentives to the personnel in these fields. Rewards would need to be tied to increasing synchronization and reinforcing organization, and would depend on metrics. The key desired effect would be naturalization of informational activities and elements into mainstream operations. This would require significant shifts in mindset and operations for all personnel. Metrics could be tied to successful integration of informational activities. It would reinforce unity of effort, and engage the complexity of the information environment.

4. Process

Conducting informational activities requires a process or path to create, coordinate, synchronize, gain approval, and execute a specific action. Currently, each informational element has a distinct process. The actual processes can be defined for PA and IO roughly as public affairs guidance (to inform) and PSYOP product approval (to influence). This set of distinct methods allows for a broad range of processes to facilitate informational activity. It also allows for significant variation and adaptability in creation and dissemination. This adaptability exists without any unity of effort or creation of mass. These distinct processes can be very responsive and proactive, but not in any synchronized manner.

To align these processes, an overarching synchronizing strategy could focus all efforts on common goals. This would be in line with the aim of SC. It would retain variety and adaptability, and support the credibility of the individual elements. It also would enable synchronization, and reinforce the organization's authority.

5.   Structure

When discussing organization, structure becomes the most important aspect. The Star Model provides a view that considers structure, but tempers the desire to fix with restructuring alone. Currently a command staff is comprised of distributed staff functions. Public Affairs and IO doctrinally belong to different areas of a command. This structure creates distance. Although synchronization occurs through working or planning groups, these groups lack the authority to drive action. This distributed structure can work against itself. While it builds credibility and increases variation in developing informational activities, it lacks unity of effort, which potentially decreases the overall credibility and effectiveness of informational activities.

The distributed staff tempts a centralization solution. One structure that emerged during the interviews would insert a median in the process spectrum, i.e., a central office with distributed staff elements. A central office within the command could synchronize and direct informational efforts, while the development and execution of these activities would occur in the distributed staff elements. This structure would balance variation, adaptability, unity of effort and economy of force. Credibility in this construct could be simplified but maintained through the distributed structure of the elements.

6.   Culture

Culture focuses on behaviors and beliefs of a particular group, specifically the individual informational elements that might interact in a given strategy. Cultures are defined by a common vision, nature, path, set of values or direction. Separate cultures would imply that informational elements (PA and IO) would have different visions, paths, values, and direction. This construct would provide for ample variation and increased complexity. As a result, separate cultures could increase the potential for surprise externally and internally. This variation and complexity supply significant potential for a new means to communicate. Separate cultures potentially limit unity of effort and mass among elements. It

also complicates creating economy of force. These limitations and complications work against synchronization. Under this construct, existing command and control would prevent excessive lack of unity of effort and mass.

A balance point exists between having a common and several distinct cultures. The alignment point is an over-arching culture that allows for distinct subcultures. Imagine a homogenous U.S. population whose only differences are the result of one's origin–in being from New York, Indiana, California. The American identity is a binding point from which the subcultures derive their distinct identities. This construct has the potential for variation and complexity, while creating unity of effort and mass. It would provide a mechanism for understanding and working with the global and pervasive nature of the information environment. It would also create a delicate balance between complexity and unity of effort. It serves to preserve distinct credibility while providing a binding point for all elements.

7.   Leadership

Leadership has been identified as a critical piece for organizing and synchronizing informational elements. The interviewees provided the following desirable leadership traits.[145]

- Broad understanding of informational elements
- Solid communication skills
- Well-rounded staffing ability
- Extensive planning and operational background

A leader with these traits would engender credibility in guiding informational activities, and could reinforce synchronization and effectively manage

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[145] NORAD USNORTHCOM Subject Matter Expert A, B and C, interview by author, 2008; JIOWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008; JFWC Subject Matter Expert, interview by author, 2008; Armstrong, interview by author, 2008.

organization. In effect, these traits balance the needs inherent in the principles of war and the information environment. While they drive execution, they do not allow leadership to replace the other aligning pieces of this model.

D.   ANALYTICAL SUMMATION

> The method employed I would gladly explain, while I have it so clear in my head, If I had but the time… but much yet remains to be said.[146]

Unity of effort, economy of force and mass all point to the need for all operations to be focused, coordinated, and synchronized to effectively accomplish the mission. The nature of the information environment must be factored into all informational activities. The problem space is riddled with diverging natures, doctrines, and policy that must be addressed to ensure a cohesive narrative for homeland defense and civil support. A modified Star Model provides aligning pieces to support all of the demands for a cohesive narrative.

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[146] Carroll, *The Hunting of the Snark*, 80.

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V.   CAPTURE

The thing can be done, said the Butcher, I think.
The thing must be done, I am sure.
The thing shall be done! Bring me paper and ink,
The best there is time to procure.[147]

The butcher in the quote above is correct. Organizing and synchronizing informational elements can be done. This paper has examined Public Affairs (PA) and Information Operations (IO) as a microcosm of all informational elements within homeland defense and civil support. Within this microcosm, the information environment has been defined as complex, global, and pervasive. If information is focused on the meaning assigned, then information plays a critical role within operations. Information serves to frame any operation, and must be considered ahead of or concurrently with any operation. Public Affairs is focused on being the primary organizational voice. Information Operations is focused on gaining operational advantage with information. The intermixing of PA and IO highlights a struggle to accomplish very similar tasks with distinct intended audiences. The distinction between these activities lies in how one defines informing and influencing, with the credibility of PA being at stake. In practice, any informational activity craves credibility with its audience. Strategic Communication (SC) is considered a process, albeit a temporary one, according to the experts interviewed. This lack of permanence leaves the status quo between PA and IO unchanged, while preventing any real change.

To envision any change in this status quo and to organize and synchronize PA and IO into a viable coherent informational strategy, the following must occur:

- Develop and enhance the Department of Defense knowledge of the information environment and the information elements to match the current knowledge of the domains (air, land, maritime) and their operations.

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147 Carroll, *The Hunting of the Snark*, 77.

- Information Operations must be redefined, similar to the British or NATO definitions, to encompass a broad understanding and scope that supports operations with the employment of integrated capabilities.

- PA must recalibrate its policy and doctrinal views to nurture a culture of connection vice separation to accentuate its role in operations.

- The difference between an informing activity and an influencing activity is negligible. These activities need to be defined in a way that allows unfettered informational effort in the current information environment.

- While the complexity of the information environment provides no best practice, the community and the analysis lean toward a smart practice of organization for SC.

- To create change in how informational elements interact and proceed, SC needs a culture and practice that requires informational elements to bend to a common path without squelching its distinct cultures.

A.   UNDERSTANDING THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

The importance of education concerning the information environment and how it relates to operations cannot be overstated. Increasingly, defense activities rely on shaping or deterring informational activities to accomplish a desired goal. The bulk of these activities is informational in nature, and requires a holistic approach that includes private and non-governmental organizations. Understanding the information environment and information itself is critical to any viable strategy for organizing and synchronizing PA and IO. This study has presented more about the information environment than exists in current Joint doctrine. This indicates a limited understanding of the information environment and information, which prevents any deep consideration and realistic execution of the informational elements. The information environment, with its intangibles, leaves many looking for substantive text to understand its true dimensions. A significant review and a developed understanding of the information environment

is required to revamp doctrine. It also will provide the planner, operator, and decision maker with a view of the environment that allows a natural integration of informational activities, just as it would kinetic activities.

B.   INFORMATION OPERATIONS NEED REDEFINING

The spectrum of potential action for IO abounds, and is only limited by a planner's imagination. The current practice and doctrine of IO is starkly varied. Air Force doctrine and policy place PA operations within the scope of IO.[148] The Army is rewriting IO doctrine where IO capabilities are being scattered to various parts of an Army organization.[149] Naval and Joint doctrine remains on the existing Joint Publication 3–13 path. Joint IO may become obsolete considering changes in service doctrine.

The real issue of IO concerns definition. When one speaks to any informational professional, IO is defined differently by each person. This is based on the relative position of that person and IO. For instance, an electronic warfare professional will view IO as a technical issue. A psychological operations professional will say IO is about influence. Each of them would be partially correct. However, IO also could be seen as focused exclusively on the core capabilities. These differing definitions limit how information becomes integrated into operations at large. What is needed is a clear definition, one that would provide direction.

Simply, IO is about gaining the operational advantage with information. This is the goal of IO. This vision is clarified by the definition. The definition must answer what information and informational elements will be used, and who will be affected.

[148] Department of Defense, Secretary of the Air Force, *Air Force Doctrine Document 2–5 Information Operations* (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2005), 4.

[149] Department of Defense, Headquarters Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3–0 Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008), 7–3.

In most definitions, IO uses integrated or coordinated capabilities or actions to affect others and to protect our own. Both of these actions are sufficiently broad and require a specific target. The recipient of an IO action could be anyone. Obviously, this is a broad group, too broad for operational benefit. More simply, those affected would be adversaries and neutrals; those protected would be friendly recipients and other selected groups.

Therefore, the definition recommended by the author for IO and for incorporation into the next version of JP 3–13 is as follows: The integrated activities (combined kinetic and non-kinetic or informational) to affect the will, understanding or capability of adversaries, neutral and other selected groups (others), and to protect the will, understanding or capability of friendly or other selected groups (our own).

This definition is a point of departure for doctrinal development. It acknowledges the full spectrum of recipients by looking beyond adversarial and friendly groups, and by focusing on people, not things. This distinction may allow for action, while keeping the people who will be affected or protected in mind. It also focuses first, on what is to be accomplished rather than how it will be accomplished, as is the case with the current definition.

C.   PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND THE CULTURE OF CONNECTION

Public Affairs acts as the primary voice of an organization. Those who work in PA understand its role and actions within the organization. The weak link lies in its doctrine concerning separation from other informational activities. This inhibits the connection PA needs to translate organizational requirements into operational action. Separation is an imperative of current PA doctrine, which stresses the need for separation between PA and almost every other discipline. Despite the call for close coordination with most of these disciplines, separation is the mantra of PA. It is rooted in the belief that connection decreases credibility. Understandably, credibility is critical, but credibility is inherent in every communication, not just PA communications.

Public Affairs literature and experts both admit that PA needs to be more operational. This would require close coordination and deep connections into the planning and operational processes. However, PA cannot be operational and separated at the same time. Admittedly, it is the only military discipline that can communicate with experience and savvy to the media and the public. This makes PA distinct without having to be separate. Potentially, anyone can be a communicator, but PA professionals become the conduit for helping those communicators. Public Affairs is the communicator of choice, especially in the homeland defense and civil support arenas.

If the goal is to enable PA's operational credibility, then PA must embrace a culture of connection. This means the PA doctrine and policy must avoid discussing separation from informational disciplines. No other discipline can act in the way PA can, nor should it. Doctrine can define what PA is without defining what it is not. The challenge then is about credibility. The doctrine and policy and practice of PA must be transparent to its audience, whenever practical, to demonstrate its role. The Principle and Fundamentals of Information provide plenty of direction in this area.[150] Stressing connection instead of separation would be step one in creating that culture.

Second, PA must emphasize the need to be involved in the operational and planning processes. If the first recommendation concerns the importance of information, then PA must be provided adequate resources (manpower and training) to be able to connect to the operational and planning processes. Public Affairs personnel must be educated about the planning and operational processes to allow for efficient operational integration and interaction. This also requires educating PA personnel about the other informational disciplines and how they connect to and integrate with other informational elements while remaining distinct, not separate, for their own mission set.

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[150] *Joint Publication 3–61 Public Affairs* (2005), I–3–I–6.

D. COMMUNICATION VERSUS TO INFORM AND INFLUENCE

What is the difference between informing activities and influencing activities? The difference can only be characterized as a perception. At the core of the difference between these activities lies the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948. The Smith-Mundt Act prohibits the use of influence materials intended for foreign audiences, on domestic audiences.[151] This distinction also differentiates what is informing (typically PA) and influencing (typically IO).

This act was conceived during the late 1940s.[152] The information environment at that time could be controlled with regard to what was released to a given audience.[153] The current information environment is pervasive, global, and complex. Today, a message released in one part of the world can be seen by other parts of the world, to include a domestic audience, within minutes. The Smith-Mundt Act only serves to limit how the domestic audience participates in the international telling of the U.S. narrative. This bifurcation also hampers a unity of effort, especially in the PA-IO realm. The distinction between informing and influencing activities creates the wedge that drives PA and IO apart in order to preserve credibility. Removing this wedge at its legal foundation would allow for realigning communication efforts.

The Smith-Mundt Act needs to be tailored to the current information environment. Communication at its root seeks to sway or affect the recipient, regardless of seeking to inform or influence. Instead of separating audiences, the Smith-Mundt Act should define a set of standards that the U.S. government can employ with respect to any audience. The distinction of informing and/or influencing would be replaced by standards-driven communication. These standards could be a derivative of the DoD Principles of Information or the

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[151] *U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948* (or Smith Mundt Act of 1948).

[152] Matt Armstrong, "Rethinking Smith–Mundt," *Small Wars Journal,* http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/07/rethinking–smithmundt/, 1–2.

[153] Ibid.

Principles of Strategic Communication.[154] This set of standards would enable a universal credibility and unity of effort in the communication realm, while allowing for transparency and feedback into communication efforts. The removal of the prohibition would allow the domestic audiences to see what is communicated to foreign audiences. This would support transparency of message and domestic feedback mechanisms in national communication efforts.

E.   SMART PRACTICE IN ORGANIZATION AND SYNCHRONIZATION

Suggesting one organizational strategy over another must be done with significant consideration of the variables at work in the organization. The framework suggested below is made with the consideration that the strategy will be reviewed to determine if it fits into the current environment. The strategy must evolve with the environment. There is no permanent solution to the informational challenge, rather a set of evolving strategies that must engage a complex environment and manage the numerous pieces connected to the mission.

Instead of a best practice, this paper recommends an optimal "smart" practice based on interviews and model analysis.[155] In this environment, the smart practice for organization and synchronization would be a central SC office with a set of distributed elements within a combatant command. One critical part of this smart practice would be that the authority and responsibility for informational efforts lies in the core office. Without the authority and responsibility here, the elements will not conform to any common direction. This hub of authority would provide a means of creating a cohesive narrative and overarching culture that drives the elements to employ their capabilities effectively. This framework also would balance variation, unity of effort, and

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[154] Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Joint Communication, *Principles of Strategic Communication*.

[155] Eugene Bardach, *A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path* to More Effective Problem Solving, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2004), 91, in "Changing Homeland Security: Teaching the Core," Homeland Security Affairs, II, no. 1, 2006, Chris Bellavita and Ellen Gordon, http://www.hsaj.org/pages/volume2/issue1/pdfs/2.1.1.pdf, 13.

economy of force and mass. It would allow distinct elements to retain their processes, cultures, and capabilities, while allowing for a common structure and narrative for the organization.

F.   STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION NEEDS AUTHORITY

Strategic Communication is a process that synchronizes informational efforts. The struggle to organize and synchronize these elements falls to SC personnel. If SC is temporary in nature, then no transformation of the elements will occur. Granted, the SC process should be organic to the staff at large, but the size and composition of the staff precludes an effective organic process among elements. The informational elements are driven by their individual natures. Just like Newton's first law of motion, these elements will act as they always have unless acted upon by an outside force. Strategic Communication can force that change if it has the appropriate authority. To force that transformation, SC must be given primacy over informational elements. Strategic Communication leadership must be able to guide other elements with the tacit authority of the organizational leadership.

Strategic Communication also needs a culture that guides the subcultures of the distinct informational elements. This would provide the common direction and values of the organizational objectives. It can be harnessed by policy and education. Each informational element should retain its distinct culture and activity, but the SC culture would provide a touchstone within the organization for these elements. The policy should also dictate the link between organizational leadership and the SC personnel. All organizational leaders should be educated about the SC process and policy, and the informational elements.

One risk in the policy realm is the temptation to develop doctrine. Doctrine serves to codify the standard day-to-day practices that have been successful in the past in a given area. This paper has identified the limitations of doctrine in the areas of PA and IO. Strategic Communication must be allowed flexibility based on the complex information environment, organizational geography, and the

desired effects, which a written doctrine cannot do. Strategic Communication doctrine would hamper any effort to find workable solutions for synchronizing informational efforts.

G. FINDING THE SNARK IN INFORMATIONAL ELEMENTS

> For the Snark's a peculiar creature, that won't be caught in a commonplace way. Do all that you know, and try all that you don't: not a chance must be wasted to-day![156]

Just like the Snark, an organizational strategy is a peculiar creature. It will not be caught or realized in a commonplace way. Homeland defense and civil support are two missions where informational efforts are critical to achieving the mission objectives. Public Affairs and IO have distinct natures that support homeland defense and civil support. These natures are seemingly mirrors of one another. Public Affairs is an organizational and credibility focused element. Information Operations is an operational and advantage-gaining element. These differences are bound to their doctrine. Doctrine drives the respective cultures and directions. One issue defines the divide between PA and IO, and that is the difference between informing activities versus influencing activities. While no clear distinction exists between these activities, this issue is the greatest challenge to organizing and synchronizing PA and IO. Strategic Communication provides a potential force to transform these elements into synchronized elements while maintaining their distinct natures.

To identify a viable and coherent organizational strategy for informational elements, leadership must understand the information environment. Within that environment, leadership must understand each distinct element's capabilities and cultures, and the complexity of these informational elements working simultaneously. Then leadership can develop and employ a process and structure that retains the variation of means and supports unity of effort, economy of force and mass.

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[156] Carroll, *The Hunting of the Snark*, 68.

Considering all of the recommendations, an organization or command (such as a combatant command) would have a central SC office. That office would coordinate to create and refine activities associated with any operation. These SC activities would be tied to operations and mission accomplishment. In advance of an event, planning would create potential activities for PA and IO to develop and execute. The command leadership would understand and expect these activities due to their understanding of the importance of the information environment to the success of the operation.

Public Affairs would be integral to several elements of the command, including IO. Public Affairs staff would monitor the situation, understanding the scope of potential activities that would communicate the desired objectives of the mission. Information Operations would develop information objectives to support the entire operation. These activities would be refined for optimal use and effect in the operation. Public Affairs and IO could work in close coordination without fear of trampling the communication or element credibility. The event in the information environment would be a synchronized narrative of the operation. This narrative would enable operations in a timely and effective manner to support civil authorities or homeland defense.

In this study, the Snark may be SC. If given authority, it has the potential to be the overarching culture that could force the elements toward a common cohesive path. Strategic Communication could drive a synchronized process that preserves the credibility of each distinctive element, while allowing for the adaptability, multiple voices, and paths for successfully engaging the informational environment.

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